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Abstract 
Social housing providers confront an array of risks strategically and operationally. 
Recently, models of hybrid organisations have been developed to understand how non-
profit landlords are changing in response to market and other external pressures. In 
this paper we draw on a multidisciplinary conceptual framework of external and 
internal risks, multiple stakeholders and resilience strategies, as well as the notion of 
hybridity, in order to make sense of change in Scotland's social housing sector. The 
paper draws on elite interviews as well as case studies that seek to capture the range of 
approaches adopted by providers. Although providers handle and respond to risk in a 
variety of ways, risk management is a necessary part of the management of social 
housing businesses. Increasingly providers are concerned with questions of resilience - 
the need to make themselves as organisations more resilient and also to promote 
greater resilience amongst tenants as a way of mitigating risk. Our research suggests 
that this is leading to some positive outcomes e.g. greater diversity within the sector 
and increased customer focus but there is concern that government polices remain 
siloed and are insufficiently flexible to deal with changed circumstances and the 
evolving needs and aspirations of the sector. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the different ways Scottish social housing landlords are 
responding organisationally to critical but frequently unquantifiable changes in their 
operating environments. We seek to frame how effective these responses are in terms of 
risk, resilience, multiple stakeholders and the increasing hybridity of landlord activities.  
This process of organisational change is also a critical factor in shaping appropriate 
Scottish housing policy frameworks for non-market housing in a context where there is 
no clear vision or aim for social landlords within the housing policy setting.  
Social housing is a long-term business. Existing tenants may stay with a landlord for 
decades and new developments are financed out of projected rents over possibly very 
long periods - 25 years or more. A stable policy framework, which the housing sector in 
Scotland enjoyed for quarter of a century prior to the financial crisis and the onset of 
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austerity policies, is advantageous not least because risk or uncertainty increases the 
cost of borrowing. As we can see from recent developments south of the border, where 
the independent Office of National Statistics (ONS) has altered the classification of 
housing association to public non-financial corporations, the sector is very vulnerable to 
policy changes.2 [Scotland and the other non-English nations of the UK are to be 
examined by the ONS regarding re-classification in the fourth quarter of 2016: similar 
regulatory governance in Scotland makes reclassification the likely outcome].  
Scottish social housing has been exposed to profound external shocks, most notably as a 
result of the financial crash, as well as the cumulative effect of policies such as the Right 
to Buy. There is acute concern also about the potential impact of welfare reform.  The 
capacity of housing providers to understand and then manage these types of risk is 
partly governed by path dependency: their existing long term commitments shape their 
operations and reflect each organisation’s mission. The capacity for resilience in the 
face of new and challenging risks is conditioned and sometimes constrained by the 
influence of diverse stakeholders who, at different points of time, have more or less 
power over the trajectory of the housing provider. Our argument is that the capacity to 
develop resilience in the face of these new risks and contexts is now a critical aspect of 
what social housing providers must do. However, as the evidence from our study shows, 
resilience practices take a variety of forms consequent on strategic choices made by 
different organisations within the sector. To the extent that a more diverse sector is 
better able to meet the needs of clients and the requirements of different places, there 
are benefits in greater heterogeneity. But diversity also creates challenges for housing 
policy and regulation, which are not adapting quickly enough to changes in the sector 
and the environment it operates in. 
Our starting point is with these challenges facing the sector. After a long phase of 
relative stability, social housing is now facing multiple uncertainties, which necessitate 
strategic responses, both from individual providers and at sector level (XX, et al, 2015). 
First, the long-standing model of mixed funding for UK social housing (i.e. combining 
upfront capital grants with long term private finance) has been destabilised by the 
removal or massive reduction in availability of long term bank debt finance consequent 
on the financial crisis and by government austerity policies which have curtailed capital 
subsidy3 and also put downward pressure on housing-related benefits. The pre-existing 
financial model is now unsustainable and neither the UK nor Scottish governments 
show signs of bringing forward a durable replacement. Second, unfolding welfare 
reform in the UK is starting to affect landlord income streams as many benefit-
dependent working age tenants face reductions in support, greater conditionality and a 
more punitive sanctions regime. Third, political and constitutional upheaval has created 
additional uncertainty for Scottish providers, given the different philosophies and 
policies of governments in power in London and in Edinburgh. There is little co-
ordination between devolved governments and Westminster on housing matters. 
Fourth, a series of drivers: demographic, labour market and competition from private 
renting – all challenge longstanding assumptions about demand, opportunities for 
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growth and product range. These and other factors (e.g. regulatory statutory 
requirements to protect tenant interests) have led to a substantially different risk 
environment for social housing compared with a decade ago. 
One important way that housing experts have tried to make sense of how providers are 
responding to the new climate makes use of the concept of hybridity. Providers who 
traditionally were essentially managers of social housing are taking on new roles that 
are combined with housing management (Mullins, et al, 2012). Instead of single purpose 
organisations they become hybrid organisations.  Authors have identified apparent 
tensions arising between new commercial goals and more traditional social enterprise 
objectives in countries like the UK and the Netherlands (Gruis, 2008; Mullins and 
Pawson, 2010). While hybridity is an intuitively appealing concept, Mullins et al (2012, 
p.406) are surely right to echo Skelcher (2012) who agued that despite its widespread 
use, hybridity ’seems to play no useful function in theory building or advice to policy 
makers’. We agree with Mullins et al that the utility of such concepts is whether or not 
(and the extent to which) the concept of hybridity ‘can clarify and theorise tensions that 
would have been otherwise opaque’ (p.406). In order to define hybridity, Mullins et al 
go on (p.407) to highlight the importance of 6 hybrid features relevant to social housing: 
relatively persistent multiple stakeholders and significant characteristics of more 
than one sector but roots in one sector in particular. They also point to the 
importance of hybrid financial dependencies, hybrid governance structures and 
hybrid products and services. 
As we indicate below, several of these six features are prominent in our risk/resilience 
framework developed in this paper. At the same time, Vincent Gruis and others have 
argued that hybridity amongst affordable housing providers or indeed sectors can be 
categorised and also trends indicated via a two by two matrix with the social versus 
commercial goals as one axis, and the contrast between social housing missions versus 
diversification into different lines of business, as the other.  Responses to new risks have 
included diversifying into new business lines (e.g. market rented or care homes or 
factoring services), growing the business through organic or merger processes and 
shifting towards a more commercial orientation though for instance partnership with 
the private sector, finance or other parties.  
Figure 1, based on Gruis (2008; Priemus and Gruis, 2011), is a set of social housing 
archetypes based on the Dutch experience. Diversification is described in terms of the 
axis between Defender (social housing management focus) and Prospector 
(diversification). Priemus and Gruis argue that Dutch social housing moved from the top 
left quadrant towards the bottom right although there was also movement towards the 
other two boxes. The matrix allows us to map where different national systems and 
indeed individual providers within a diverse sector are located and in which 
direction(s), if any, they are moving. Care is needed with how the matrix is used – it 
does not serve as a measure of hybridity and we need to be very careful to avoid the 
suggestion that greater hybridity is our preferred direction of travel for the sector, as 
there is insufficient evidence so far to demonstrate that the more hybrid an organisation 
is the better placed it might be to weather storms. But the matrix does provide an 
illustrative framework to account for the different approaches being taken in the sector.  
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Figure 1 here 
 
One perspective on hybridity is that it is both a response to and an outcome of more or 
less considered strategic resilient responses by providers to the risks and uncertainties 
they perceive they face in the short to medium term, as well as their array of influencing 
stakeholders and path dependencies. We can also argue that hybrid choice outcomes 
are themselves a subset of a wider range of questions that are essentially about the 
industrial organisation (IO) of non-profit housing providers [Gibb and Nygaard, 2006; 
Gibb, 2013]. Different responses to the IO choices facing providers will also help explain 
hybridity outcomes in the 2 by 2 diagram above and also preparedness to face new risks 
and to be resilient. 
In this paper we will explore these ideas about risk, resilience and hybridity set against 
the Scottish social housing sector. Our fundamental research questions are, first, which 
resilience strategies, including changing hybrid structures, are being developed by the 
sector and by case study providers in Scotland in response to the new risk or emerging 
risk environment? Second, to what extent do the models applied in this paper help to 
inform this understanding?  
The authors carried out a yearlong study of the contemporary social housing sector in 
Scotland framed in terms of resilience to emerging risks and challenges. The study built 
on an earlier paper by two of the authors (XX and YY, 2014) and an earlier international 
study of larger affordable housing providers in the UK, Canada, Australia and Norway 
(Maclennan and Chisholm, editors, 2013), which also involved one of the research team 
directly. The most recent project intended to construct an overview of the sector as a 
whole and involved an international evidence review, in-depth elite interviews with a 
representative cross-section of leaders of the sector, four diverse detailed case studies 
of social housing organisations, and two meetings of a sounding board of senior housing 
professionals (see: XX, YY and ZZ, 2015). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction, we unpack the multiple 
notions of risk and resilience and build a simple conceptual framework that attempts to 
capture the essence of the relationship between risk, hybridity, multiple stakeholders 
and resilience in the contemporary Scottish social housing sector. Sections 3 and 4 
report evidence on, respectively, elite semi-structured interviews and the four case 
studies. Section 5 is a concluding discussion that relates the evidence back to the 
conceptual framework and assesses the wider implications of the paper’s findings. 
 
Social housing in Scotland 
Housing policy has been devolved to Scotland since 1999 and there has been significant 
divergence from the rest of the UK subsequently, for instance, the ending of the right to 
Buy in Scotland and its distinctive progressive homelessness legislation (Gibb, 2012). 
However, public spending rules, social security and elements of housing taxation remain 
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reserved at UK level4. Social housing has declined as a share of all households from 32% 
in 1999 to 23% in 2013 (Scottish Household Survey, various) and like the rest of the UK, 
private renting has grown over this period (from 5% to 13%). In March 2011 there 
were 320,000 council homes and 275,000 housing association homes (Audit Scotland, 
2013). 
In Scotland social housing primarily consists of local authority (council) housing in the 
public sector and third sector, often charitable, non-profit housing associations (also 
known as Registered Social Landlords – RSLs). Housing is allocated according to need 
criteria, rents are set well-below market rents and tenancies are generally secure. Low 
income tenants, not just those not in employment, may receive income-related benefits 
to help pay for some or all of their rental costs. In Scotland, Government has a ‘pot’ of 
capital funding that provides grants for new build social housing, broadly equivalent for 
councils or housing associations5 and these are considerably more generous per unit 
than in England. However, the overall programme size is constrained and new social 
and affordable supply (mainly low cost home ownership) is insufficient to meet 
commonly accepted levels of overall housing need. In a major new study of housing 
need in Scotland, and set against a context of sluggish housebuilding, rising housing 
costs and household projections, Powell, et al (2015) estimate that core overall annual 
affordable housing need has increased by about 50% from around 8,000 units in 2006 
to about 12,000 units in 2015 (about twice the level of new annual affordable supply in 
Scotland from 2011-16). 
Scotland has 26 council housing organisations (6 others transferred through whole 
stock transfer after tenant ballot, including Glasgow). There are more than 160 housing 
associations (and there are more if you include small specialist providers), which are 
made up of nearly 70 neighbourhood level community housing associations and co-
operatives, plus rural specialists, regional and national bodies as well as larger 
specialist providers. In recent years there has been some intrusion by non-Scottish 
providers through merger, start-up and registration in Scotland as Scottish-registered 
subsidiaries. Scottish housing associations range in size from 200 units to around 
40,000. 
While there is a comparatively small amount of diversification by housing associations 
into other forms of housing provision – mainly into low cost home ownership like 
shared equity shared ownership programmes, and, to a lesser extent, to affordable or 
mid market renting and related projects, this is not the main way they diversify their 
activities6. Rather, many housing associations are adopting wider community anchor 
roles, in some cases supporting employment and employability of their residents and 
also supporting communities through welfare advice, financial inclusion and other 
related activities. 
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2. Risk, Resilience and Social Housing 
The Multiple Meanings of Risk  
The concept of risk can have many meanings and layers. The Oxford dictionary defines 
risk as “a situation involving exposure to danger”7. However the notion of risk can 
embrace upsides as well as downsides e.g. financial returns to a risky economic 
prospect may be positive and profitable, rather than negative or loss making. 
Assigning a numerical value to risk based on the probability of an outcome has become 
the cornerstone of the managerial technique of risk management which many 
businesses, including social enterprises, have adopted. Risks are eventualities that can 
be anticipated, measured and mitigated against. Mainstream economists make 
behavioural assumptions and identify preferences about risk averseness, risk neutrality 
or even a preference for risk-taking – without worrying about the implications of 
genuine uncertainty or indeed how to make reasoned decisions based on risk in 
practice (Wilkinson, 2008). Their interest is not in the dangers posed by a specific risk, 
but how an individual or organisation behaves in response to risk more generally. 
Classical writings on risk from an economic perspective include those of Knight (1921) 
and Keynes (1937). The former famously did distinguish between risk and uncertainty 
by arguing that unlike risk, uncertainty meant that that there was not enough 
information with which to assign numerical probabilities to future outcomes. Keynes 
took this argument further by distinguishing that which is certain from that which is 
probable. Decision-makers must accept that they live in a world that is characterised by 
uncertainty.  
Other writers, following Beck (1992), have viewed risk as a social construction rather 
than a probabilistic calculation. It is the perception of risk, rather than the likelihood of 
something happening, which ultimately matters to the public consciousness. Zinn and 
Taylor Gooby (2006) argue that possible catastrophes, such as environmental damage 
linked to climate change, loom large in many people’s minds, even though we may be 
safer from physical danger than ever before8. Pressure on the state to regulate and 
control risk is not always consistent with the objective dexposure to danger. In the 
context of social landlords, risk is about the assessment and management of the dangers 
to social housing organisations and their customers. In the course of the interviews for 
this project, a clear theme was a heighted awareness of risk and the proactive use by 
social landlords of risk management techniques such as risk registers. 
In the course of the study, several respondents mentioned Cosmopolitan Housing 
Group.  Cosmopolitan was an English social housing organisation that, having 
diversified by investing in the provision of student accommodation, failed to manage the 
risks involved appropriately and proportionally.  It came to the attention of the English 
Social Housing Regulator that Cosmopolitan was experiencing cash flow problems and 
therefore faced possible financial collapse. Cosmopolitan was ultimately rescued by 
becoming part of the Sanctuary Group in March 2013.9 According to a follow-up report 
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commissioned by the English Regulator the cause of the collapse at Cosmopolitan was a 
serious failure of governance within the organisation over a number of years, with 
previous regulators in England failing to appreciate the severity of the risks within 
Cosmopolitan. The report concluded that had regulation in the early 2000s been more 
comprehensive, the crisis might have been avoided. (Underwood, Kane & Appleby, 
2014)   
Given that the Cosmopolitan situation was not just an organisational failure but also a 
systemic one, it has additionally affected the approach of the Scottish Housing Regulator 
(SHR). The SHR has published advice to social landlords on “Financial Risk and 
Viability”.  The SHR repeatedly stresses in its advice that RSLs need to maintain a strong 
focus on financial health and financial sustainability. It sees its statutory role in terms of 
protecting tenants from management failings – either through increased rent or 
reduction in services provided – and insuring that any adverse impact is minimised. It 
sees a key role for the governing body of each association as being to challenge 
management and to get assurance that everything possible is being done to manage the 
risk to financial health. It is within that context that the SHR has a clear regulatory 
expectation that RSLs will have robust business planning and risk management 
processes in place. 
Landlords also confront internal risks as a result of path dependency and previous 
decisions with long-term consequences (e.g. development programmes with specific 
built forms or expensive contractual commitments). At the same time, as identified by 
Mullins, et al (2012), social housing providers face multiple stakeholders, which, 
because of their ambiguous position between the voluntary sector and the public sector 
– can at different times and in different sub-sectors play a major influencing role 
shaping the direction of specific providers and the wider sector. Key stakeholders are: 
the Scottish Housing Regulator who has the power to remove boards and senior staff 
(there are also charity and care regulators); the Scottish Government who set the policy 
framework, provide capital subsidy and the wider investment programme; the UK 
government sets taxation, benefits and broader banking/financial regulations; lenders 
and capital markets who set terms, conditions and covenants for social providers; 
contractors and other partners, plus local government, resident communities and 
tenants.  The notion that social landlords are, in some sense, free to pursue their goals 
need to be heavily qualified. However, it would also be incorrect to say that agency 
plays no role in shaping the strategy and major decision-making of Scottish social 
landlords. 
 
 
Resilience 
Zolli and Healy (2012) show how the concept of resilience can be used to refer to 
economic, ecological, social or technical systems and to both people and organisations. 
They define resilience as:  
“…the capacity of a system, enterprise or a person to maintain its core purpose and 
integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances” (Zolli and Healey, 2012, p8) 
Another way of interpreting the concept is focused on the adaptability of an 
organisation.  Hamel and Valikangas (2003) point to an organisation’s ability to go 
beyond merely responding to setbacks as being fundamentally important to ensuring its 
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resilience and consequently, its success: “strategic resilience is not about responding to a 
one-time crisis. It’s not about rebounding from a setback. It’s about continuously 
anticipating and adjusting to deep, secular trends that can permanently impair the 
earning power of a core business. It’s about having the capacity to change before the case 
for change becomes desperately obvious” (p3). 
The theme of continually reviewing and examining an organisation’s strategic purpose 
was to the fore throughout our project. Almost everyone interviewed referred to 
flexibility as one of the characteristics that a resilient organisation should display. 
Flexibility in this context means that organisations can adapt and have the necessary 
financial arrangements and controls in place to meet the many challenges that the 
housing sector faces.  
Taylor (2013, p.5-6) sets out her understanding of the different meanings of resilience 
as they relate to Scottish housing associations. Taylor defines resilience relating to 
business, psychology and ecology as:  
 Business (continuity): the ability of an organisation’s business operations to rapidly 
adapt and respond to internal or external dynamic changes and continue 
operations with limited impact on to the business 
 The ability to recover quickly from illness, change or misfortune, in other words 
buoyancy or an ability to bounce back 
 The ability to resume original shape or position after becoming bent, stretched or 
compressed – elasticity  
 The process of recovery – to learn/adapt to difficulty, to have the capacity to 
respond to a disturbance 
 The ability to absorb disturbances – to re-organise and still have the same identity. 
 
Similar arguments are made by Hamel and Valikangas, who note “momentum is not the 
force it once was” in ensuring an organisation’s success and that resilience requires “a 
capacity for continuous reconstruction”. (2003, p4) 
Like risk, the concept of resilience is multi-layered and multi-dimensional and can be 
applied in different ways. In housing, the term can be used in the context of a customer, 
a leader or a frontline member of staff. It can also be used to describe the characteristics 
of an organisation or even the housing sector as a whole. A resilient organisation is one 
that has the correct people with the correct skills. Individual resilience underpins 
organisational resilience.   
 
A Conceptual Framework 
Figure 2 sets out a simplified diagrammatic framework. At the centre are housing 
providers who are influenced or ‘shocked’ by external risks, which by definition they 
have no control over. Housing providers also face internal risks - the consequences of 
earlier decisions about their housing stock and committed investment and financing 
plans, their focus (i.e. where they are in the hybridity matrix) as well as industrial 
organisation decisions for which the transactions costs of changing direction are non-
trivial. These are all forms of path dependency.  
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The provider has to manage the needs and requirements of different stakeholders 
including government, tenants, the regulator, lenders and partners. Housing 
associations inhabit an ambiguous territory of ownership, governance and influence. 
They are not public bodies but government and the regulator exhibit large degrees of 
control, limiting association’s discretion over what they can do. Multiple stakeholders at 
different times and for various reasons can wield considerable influence over the sector 
as a whole, as well as over particular providers. As the diagram indicates, stakeholder 
action may force or catalyse reforms on the sector, such as the regulatory requirements 
that were stepped up in the wake of the Cosmopolitan episode.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The housing provider in different ways confronts these risks and challenges by seeking 
to develop and implement resilient responses. In the discussion of the case studies we 
will see different examples of these resilience mechanisms. Efforts to increase resilience 
are associated with a series of organisational reforms and these may, though not 
necessarily, suggest a movement within the hybridity matrix. In the rest of the paper we 
apply this framework as a heuristic simplification of the world faced by housing 
providers. 
 
3. Elite Interviews 
The project team carried out interviews with 16 senior people who had different levels 
of strategic roles within the Scottish social housing sector. The interviews were 
conducted in the months just before the Scottish Independence Referendum 
(September 18 2014).  
 
Confronting New Risks  
All interviewees cited welfare change as a key external risk: “on-going welfare changes 
are obviously a key risk, or set of risks in terms of our sector’s income and in terms of the 
income of our customers. Related to this is rising rent arrears, which is a key risk and 
something that perhaps we struggle most on”. (RSL Director) 
As a result, landlords were obliged to invest in the resilience strategy of a much greater 
level of customer intelligence, as well as a cultural shift towards working with partner 
agencies and council departments “…landlords have gotten closer to tenants...That sense 
partly of actually just all the chapping of doors that’s happened in the last 2-3 years to find 
out who is living in the properties which landlords have got to be honest and say they 
weren’t on top of” (Senior RSL figure). These changes have been both labour intensive 
and promoted staff culture change. There was also a recurring theme that many of these 
changes would have been likely to come about in any case, but concern about the new 
operational environment had hastened their introduction.  
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Pension underfunding was a key external risk for smaller RSLs in regard to financing 
pensions and the burden that they would place upon them moving forward. On more 
than one occasion it was proposed that many in the sector have not yet faced up to the 
issue. “We are going to reach a critical stage in terms of pensions. In saying that, I get no 
sense of inertia in terms of organisations pushing the issue to the background, but at the 
same time it is a major issue and risk for the sector” (Senior RSL figure). 
 
There was also internal succession planning risk consequent on the retirement of long 
serving senior staff whose experience would be hard to replace and also the difficulty in 
recruiting a new generation of committed voluntary Board members who would be able 
to deal with the new complexity facing organisations. “There is also an issue around 
governance risk. New blood is certainly needed in this area with the skills and commitment 
to make a real contribution” (Senior RSL figure). 
 
Risk and its Management  
 
Risk is at the forefront of the minds of leaders in the housing sector. Organisations had 
generally put a lot of resilience focus on increasing awareness of risk and risk 
management/mitigation to insure that managing risk is no longer the ‘job’ of one senior 
person within the organisation. As one RSL Director put it (speaking of senior staff) - “If 
you can’t describe the high level risks you shouldn’t be in the job”. One interesting view 
was also that there is an inherent risk in being too risk averse – that being so aware of 
the risks that are confronted that it impacts on levels of ambition. 
There was a perception that RSLs should consider risk in a wider societal sense as well 
as the narrow organisational context. The hardship that people are experiencing means 
that housing organisations and their partners will have to pick up the pieces with 
diminished resources. This in turn made the range of risks more complex than they 
were previously. “The key risks are to people’s incomes. This isn’t just about welfare 
reform but it’s about pressure on tenants incomes from across the board, for instance 
energy and food prices and everything else. That’s as big a risk for our organisations but it 
is also more like a social issue. It puts all our services in a difficult position”. 
(Representative organisation leader) 
 
Having the right governance, structures, staff and culture in place were seen as 
particularly important dimensions of resilience. “When I think of organisations like 
Cosmopolitan down south, you think they didn’t lack ambition but they lacked the ability 
to assess the risk and deliver against that ambition….That is the biggest risk and it also 
comes down to having the right governance and having the right skills and sophistication 
to be able to deal with that”. (RSL figure Director) Another interviewee said: “In terms of 
culture, we’re better than we used to be, we did have the tendency to plan for cataclysmic 
risks that never really happen but not plan for medium risks...we need to ensure that we 
have the right governance in place” (RSL Director). 
 
Resilience 
 
“[R]esilience is about being capable of dealing with change over the longer term… It’s 
about being flexible but at the same time keeping one’s own identity, and remembering the 
reasons why the organisations came together in the first place” (Representative 
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organisation leader).  An RSL director said: “organisational resilience is going to rely on 
sound governance, good and realistic planning” (RSL Director). The key to being resilient 
and self-aware is constantly reviewing and challenging your strategic purpose and 
mission, constantly reviewed to ensure that it is appropriate for the operational 
environment and customer base.  
 
More than one interviewee referred to the need to promote “learning organisations”. 
This was seen to be a key characteristic of resilience. “It’s about having the right skills in 
place – as a membership association that is what we tend to focus on …. I see resilience as 
being about skills, knowledge and resources”. (Representative organisation leader). A 
second view expressed was:  “It is also the ability to get the organisation not to have to 
keep doing ad hoc things – i.e. we collect learning” (RSL Director). 
 
 
Relationships with Stakeholders 
 
There was a shared sense that a significant move towards working with 
stakeholders/partners had taken place.  This was expressed in cultural terms, i.e. a 
willingness of housing organisations and providers of other services to work together, 
and also in tangible terms, i.e. in the establishment of new partnerships and ways of 
working with other agencies and other organisations. Arguably, this reflects the 
growing sense of mutual dependency between housing providers and key stakeholders 
This was despite the, at times difficult, nature and non-trivial transactions costs of 
negotiating and managing such partnerships.  
 
However, it was also the case that: “Partnerships are hugely problematic – they are 
positive in the sense of what you are trying to get to the end. But in some ways you hate 
partnerships!...we have been reasonably ok in terms of sharing budgets but we still want to 
have some control in terms of how the outcomes go- and especially the timescales. This can 
be difficult...there are huge issues in partnerships – but huge benefits – that’s why we go 
through the pain”. (RSL Director) 
 
There was a belief, particularly amongst RSL interviewees, that relationships with 
funders and the social security ministry (the Department of Work and Pensions or DWP) 
and, to a lesser extent with the Scottish Housing Regulator - were all undergoing 
fundamental change. “Clearly the relationship with funders has changed; we’ve not had 
major issues on that. But, what we know is that some funders have pulled out of the 
market, some of them have wanted to re-price for all sorts of things, and equally we have 
seen and have used some new entrants into the market”. (RSL Director).  
 
All interviewed felt that the relationship with DWP had become a fundamental one but 
there was also uneasiness in landlords being seen as being the arbiter in the 
introduction of the reforms.  “...an emerging relationship is one around welfare reform, is 
around DWP, job centres and possibly around some of the other financial organisations to 
that extent... it’s more about trying to build up products that would be of use to your 
customers” (RSL Director).   
 
 
 Future Roles  
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Social housing providers have to keep an eye on the future, because they are in a long-
term non-profit business characterised by continuing and evolving relationships. “I 
think we can see that the sector is on a journey, and always has been.… Our role now is 
perhaps more as community leaders and anchor organisations”. (Representative 
organisation leader) 
 
There were some who viewed the role of the social landlord in fairly narrow terms (as 
defenders in terms of figure 1), as fundamentally a basic landlord function of collecting 
rent and letting houses: “We blur the role of the landlord at our peril”. Another said: “One 
of the most important things that we have to hold on to is that we are landlords, we are 
not social workers...at the core of our business is a very simple transaction”. (Senior local 
authority figure). A contrary view was also expressed: “I think there will be a divergence 
between landlords who simply look just to fulfil a landlord role and others who see 
themselves as having a much broader community role. There is not anything wrong with 
simply being a landlord but I hope that we certainly fall into the second category and fulfil 
a community role and provide a range of services that can make a real difference to our 
customers’ lives”. (RSL Director) This is more akin to the social innovator role in figure 1. 
 
The tension or divide between returning to core functions or diversifying leads to 
different models. One RSL Director said: “If you look down south, they are much more 
used to diversification – you can see nursery schools, health centres, all those sorts of 
things. I’m not sure, I’m still struggling to see what they would bring to the business given 
the risks of this diversification...I think we would be more inclined to work with partners 
rather than delivering these things ourselves – diversity through partnership...Our growth 
strategy is to concentrate on what we are good at and then let’s try and partner to deliver 
what we’re not so good at, where we don’t have that experience”.  
 
The ‘choice’ between returning to core housing functions versus future diversification is 
further explored in the case studies below. 
 
4. Case studies 
Different types of housing organisation were selected as case studies to examine how 
they manage risk and display resilience (summarised in Table 1). The four case study 
organisations comprise:  
 A mid-sized (in Scottish terms) rural RSL (Albyn) 
 A smaller community based urban RSL (Cassiltoun) 
 A local authority landlord (Perth & Kinross) 
 A large group structure housing organisation (Wheatley). 
 
This diversity was reinforced by the geographical spread of the case study organisations 
across different parts of Scotland. Each case study involved two principal stages – 
examining risk register approaches and related strategy documents, and, secondly, 
interviewing key actors in the respective organisations regarding how they understand 
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and respond to the new and emerging environment. The main themes discussed with 
each case study organisation concerned risk strategy, formal approaches to risk 
management and the wider approaches taken to resilience. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Risk Strategy and Management 
All four had formal risk registers and strategies to manage risk and develop internal 
resilience strategies (see figure 2). Albyn had undergone several years of refreshing and 
training their board including making formal risk management central to the 
organisation.  A senior officer said: “the training explained that we are all risk managers 
anyway. It was no longer seen as a ‘Finance Director’ thing. It hasn’t got to the rest of the 
staff yet, but that is the next stage”.  
In the community-based association, Cassiltoun’s approach to the key external risk of 
welfare reform was summarised by the following:  “we’ve seen a lot of changes in the 
housing sector over the past 30 years including benefit changes and whilst the current 
changes are the most severe we believe our preparation, staff resources and business 
planning will help reduce the risks we face from welfare reform.  Not only have we 
identified Welfare Reform as our number one risk we have also included welfare reform as 
a key operational objective”.  
Perth and Kinross council focused on the staffing implications of the work pressures 
created by the new risks: “Income is fundamental. I think this is connected to our own 
staffing position in being able to cover work, because there is an increased workload, and 
we are all working more widely, and there is probably fewer staff to do this. Like everyone 
else we have had budget cuts, so that is a risk…It’s keeping up with this. We have all had 
reductions to staffing and increasing pressure. It’s then how you actually continue to 
deliver the services while managing all the other stuff”. 
Wheatley has explicitly sought to inculcate risk management throughout the 
organisation. Developing an organisation risk ‘culture’ has gone well beyond formal 
auditing of risks.  “What we have tried to do is to get on their (staff specific) level and say 
that (managing risk) is what we do every day…that is why we have provided guidance. 
Guidance is key because for most people it’s already in their head anyway; it’s easing it out 
of people”. Developing the culture, however, is an on-going challenge and 
communication is fundamental. This can be seen in comments by members of the risk 
audit team: “We have strong Board buy in [but] …there still needs to be more ownership 
further down the organisation”.  
  
Resilient? 
Organisational attitudes and those of staff were perceived to be important to Wheatley’s 
resilience, as exemplified by their ‘Think Yes’ campaign to empower front line staff.: “It’s 
about being a problem solving organisation, having a whole kind of ‘can do’ attitude 
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where anything is possible – it very much starts with front line officers, where they can 
change services at the point of demand. That is the most important because that is where 
we maintain our reputation and customer satisfaction”.  
Establishing the Wheatley group structure was itself fundamentally an exercise in 
resilience, for instance, in being capable of sourcing alternative sources of funding: 
“There’s quite a bit about our funding structures, how you negotiate funding agreements. 
We’ve set this up so that each of the subsidiaries can draw down as required, so each of the 
subsidiaries supports each other so everybody is in it together, but at the same time each 
subsidiary is responsible for not letting the other subsidiaries down in financial terms. This 
funding structure certainly gives us more”. 
For the council landlord (Perth & Kinross), flexibility and partnership were key 
principles of resilience. “I think stripping it back to basics, it is about being flexible about 
the things that come your way”. On partnership working in Perth & Kinross :“We’ve been 
heavily involved with Education and Children’s Services….this collaboration is very much 
about securing positive outcomes for our children and to contribute to all the big health 
outcomes as well... what can we do as a housing service – what is our contribution to this 
agenda? … It’s the wider contribution to national outcomes – in the last few years this is 
something that has really moved on”. 
For Albyn and Cassiltoun, governance reforms were key to resilience. In Cassiltoun’s 
case they focused on Board membership from the local community.  There is an 
induction, training and development plan for new and existing Board members which 
equip them with the skills to effectively carry out their role. In 2014 an independent 
governance review created an action plan to further improve training and skills and to 
also further consider specialist or professional recruitment of Board members in the 
future. Cassiltoun also see resilience coming from sound business planning in particular, 
from their 30 year Business Plan which is reviewed annually. However resilience for 
Cassiltoun is also about being on the front foot and being close to customers. Cassiltoun 
concluded that this isn’t a new thing, however, as this is what the organisation has 
always been focused on. Albyn stressed good governance, openness and transparency 
but also sensible diversification into other activities that could both generate income 
and create employment and training opportunities. 
 
Diversity and Commonalities 
Welfare reform was viewed a significant risk to the performance of organisations and 
the viability of business plans. There were, however, different opinions on the extent of 
this risk.  Resilience for all revolved around: sound business planning, effective 
governance, partnership working, and being characterised as a learning organisation. 
These themes mirrored what was found to varying extents across other elements of 
research for this study.   
We can reflect on the case studies in terms of the matrix in Figure 1 regarding social-
commercial orientation and whether social housing providers would diversify or stick 
to more core activities. The case studies do not of course fit neatly into the archetype 
cells – nonetheless, each case study indicates the increasing importance of flexibility 
and change as part and parcel of organisation’s resilient responses to their environment. 
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All three of the housing association providers have diversified their activities (some 
building on longer established plans). However, they do not all indicate an obvious shift 
in one direction on the commercial-social axis of the matrix. Several also go round the 
diversification question by entering into a range of more or less formal and more or less 
long term partnership relations with other forms of organisations. This is a way of 
managing risks with multiple stakeholders as well as delivering ether core or new 
services. While this is consistent with aspects of Mullins et al definition of hybridity, it is 
a more complex organisational form or set of relationships and not necessarily 
traditional diversification, as commonly understood. 
The framework in Figure 2 is also useful for the different types of provider explored in 
this section. The case studies face a combination of external and internal risks and the 
demands of provider-specific stakeholders. They have all sought to develop and 
implement resilient responses involving governance reform (from prioritising risk 
management, establishing new boards to setting up group structures), they have taken 
different stances to the degree of diversification they felt necessary and indeed some 
have spread into more commercial as well as avowedly social enterprise activities.  
Much though not all of this can be explained by specific path dependencies.  
 
5. Concluding Discussion 
The approach taken in this paper was, in the face of the widely agreed set of new risks 
and uncertainties threatening social housing providers, to develop a simple conceptual 
framework (figure 2) that helped focus down on the individual social housing provider 
and how they respond to the environment they face. Primary research then tested the 
different ideas about risk, resilience, stakeholders and partners, social versus 
commercial impetus, core functions versus diversification through elite interviews with 
a representative group from across the Scottish housing sector followed by four diverse 
case studies that sought to capture the range of social housing providers in Scotland. 
Our fundamental research questions were:  
 Which resilience strategies, including changing hybrid structures, are being 
developed by the sector and by case study providers in Scotland in response to 
the new risk or emerging risk environment?  
 To what extent do the models applied in this paper help to inform this 
understanding?  
Five key points emerged: 
 A new constellation of old and new risks have arisen as the status quo in terms of 
funding and policy the previous 25 years came to an end. But external risks like 
funding shortages, austerity and welfare reform should be combined with 
internal risks associated with path dependency and the persistent influence of 
multiple stakeholders who exert varying degrees of external influence. 
 The hybridity matrix (figure 1), based around axes of social or commercial focus 
and core versus diversification activities, is useful both positively (descriptively) 
and normatively (what providers and sector representatives think ought to be 
done). 
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 Investing in risk management and building resilience capacity is not just a 
passive response to regulatory demands but reflects both a growing appreciation 
of the new operating environment and a desire to embed different notions of 
organisational resilience. 
 Resilience is about organisational flexibility, strategic repurposing, good 
governance, evolution and learning – both across all levels of staffing but also in 
terms of a cultural openness to innovation, evidence and research. Operationally, 
frontline services and customer intelligence are reasserted as priorities. 
 Social landlords are diverse in Scotland and, despite calls for consolidation, it is 
not obvious, even in the presence of the aforementioned risks and changed 
operating environment, that this situation will significantly or rapidly change. 
This is because context matters. Community-based housing, for instance, is a 
successful brand and often leads and anchors its neighbourhoods or rural 
catchment areas. Some landlords may diversify and others remain focused on 
core housing management activities and both models can perform to a high 
standard. 
What does this research contribute to the hybridity debate outlined by Mullins, et al 
(2012) and the wider characterisation of organisational change in the sector? Does it 
suggest that hybridity is a useful theoretical concept? We believe it is a useful heuristic 
classificatory system that may inform policy debate but may not of itself identify the 
tensions and ambiguities that might flow from hybrid social housing organisations. We 
also think that the conceptual framework (figure 2) is also a useful device for isolating 
the range of forces operating on providers and how they may interact in a given context.  
 
We conclude that, first, there is no sensible normative solution to where individual 
organisations should locate in the matrix. It depends on too many variables. Second, we 
would note that the multiple stakeholders role in shaping contemporary housing 
organisations may be persistent but it is also variable in terms of which ones matter, 
why and when. However, third, it does seem that many if not all developing social 
landlords are moving to hybrid financial and governance structures, if not hybrid 
products and services (in the sense used by Mullins et al). But it is the underlying path 
dependency of the organisation, its history, business setting and culture that determines 
the extent of hybridity and the preferred matrix location. 
There remain a number of considerable challenges for the sector. First, particularly for 
housing associations, their very hybridity is an important ambiguity about the locus of 
control and appropriate classification of social housing. We have seen the ways in which 
regulators, government and lenders can shape and influence the direction of RSLs. 
English housing associations were re-classified because of the powers the regulator has 
over them. Reclassification means English housing association debt (more than £60 
billion) is added to the national debt. The UK government is now, as we write, working 
out how to rapidly deregulate the English sector – the future of English social housing is, 
in that context, highly uncertain. None of this yet applies elsewhere in the UK but it is 
clearly a major source of external risk and the planned examination of the sector in the 
rest of the UK later in 2016 is likely to have a similar reclassification outcome (and 
subsequent similar deregulating response with further uncertain consequences).  
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Second, and related, the Scottish sector as a whole needs to take a clear view of what the 
sector is for, whether it really embraces diversity (as we think it should), where it is 
located in the public-private spectrum and what the sense of the new established 
settlement should be for social housing? The 1989-2007 period is a distant memory 
now and there is no current or forward sense of stability or equilibrium, which is bad 
for business, for tenants, for meeting housing need and for housing system outcomes. 
Third, while diversity is a strength, it also limits the effectiveness of government polices 
which remain insufficiently flexible to deal with the different needs and aspirations of 
the sector. In other words, it remains the case that policy seeks to support a small 
number of provider models but does not adequately acknowledge the diversity or the 
flexibility required to effectively work with different hybrid forms. Different providers 
represent combinations of the six features associated with the Mullins et al (2012) 
definition of hybridity. They are where they are because of context, path dependency 
and long term planning. Policy needs to offer an array of risk-proportionate tools to 
allow further diversification where it makes sense and to protect the efficient running of 
core services at the same time. Therefore, there can be no single preferred model of 
social housing but rather social housing policy redesign should enable and not prescribe 
diversity.  
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Figure 2: Conceptualising Risk, Resilience and Reform in Contemporary Social 
Housing 
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Table 1 Case Studies 
Social provider Albyn Housing Society Cassiltoun Housing 
association 
Perth & Kinross Wheatley 
Typology  RSL, rural, with non-
housing subsidiary 
Community-based 
Glasgow RSL, with 
subsidiary 
Urban-rural local authority 
housing department 
Group structure RSL and 
subsidiaries 
Number of units 2800 across 60 
locations in the 
Highlands 
1171 owned and 
managed 
c. 7500 units Over 45,000 units in RSL 
subsidiaries: care 
factoring.  mid-market & 
market rented  
Summary 
description 
Subsidiary carries out 
all of its non-charitable 
activities, Albyn 
Enterprises Ltd. Also 
has established a joint 
venture vehicle in 
partnership with the 
Calman Trust, Calbyn, 
which looks to develop 
and manage a 124 
bedroom social 
enterprise hotel 
Community based 
RSL and is 
involved in a range 
of non-housing 
activities.  Owns 
Cassiltoun Trust, a 
subsidiary set up 
to renovate stables 
and a Social 
Enterprise pre-5 
nursery, Cassiltoun 
Stables Nursery. 
Statutory council housing 
provider for the Perth and 
Kinross area 
Group Structure – 
comprises four social 
landlords; a care 
organisation and two 
commercial subsidiaries; 
factoring business and a 
Private Rented Sector 
company. 
Number of staff c.70 20  (15 in nursery)  Not known c.2100 
Mission “Albyn Housing Society 
serves an ever-
growing number of 
communities in the 
Highlands, providing 
good quality, 
affordable housing for 
thousands of people 
across the region” 
“We aim to 
enhance the 
quality of life of 
our community 
and to regenerate 
our community 
through housing-
led and resident-
controlled 
initiatives.” 
http://www.pkc.gov.uk/hou
sing  
“Making homes and lives 
better” 
 
